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The Inter-Korean Summit of 27 April 2018 reinstated dialogue 
between North and South Korea after a decade of little 
diplomacy between the two states. In doing so, it drew significant 
international media attention. Heavy debates on how to interpret 
both the meeting itself and the prospects of further peace 
negotiations were raised. Among the spectators, several critics 
argued that the summit was merely an exercise in symbolism. 
This article aims to challenge this perception because it 
disregards the important dynamics of the negotiation process 
that took place. Using a Cultural Memory Studies approach, this 
study sets out to demonstrate the significance and complexity 
of the memory negotiations that took place during the summit. 
The study looks at some of the internal remembrance processes 
and employed modes of addressing the past. Furthermore, it 
investigates how the two actors of diplomacy temporarily altered 
the dominant “mode of remembering” their past and, through 
this, recontextualised inter-Korean relations within the time and 
space of the meeting. More specifically, this study examines 
how cultural artefacts and different forms of cultural memory 
in performative acts can be said to have created a “civil space” 
within which diplomatic talks were enabled.
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On 27 April 2018, an Inter-Korean Summit was held between delegations from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
(DPRK) and the Republic of Korea (ROK) with the 
North Korean Chairman Kim Jong Un and the South 
Korean President Moon Jae In as the central actors 
of diplomacy. The summit took place at the Joint 
Security Area (JSA) of Panmunjom and signified the 
revival of peace negotiations between DPRK and 
ROK after a decade of little diplomacy between the 
two parties. Although the armed hostilities of the 
Korean War ended on 27 July 1953 with the signing 
of the Armistice Agreement, no official peace treaty 
was ever signed. Consequently, this newly instated 
dialogue sparked significant international media at-
tention. The summit ignited heavy debates on how 
to interpret this meeting, along with the prospect of 
further peace negotiations. Many of the media spec-
tators have shown themselves to be critical of the 
effects of this summit. Additionally, several critics 
have claimed that “the summit was a mere exercise 
in symbolism” (Botto & Jo, 2018) because so many, 
both internal and external, political interests are at 
play in the Korean conflict. Nevertheless, by calling 
the meeting “mere symbolism,” these critics seem 
to regard definitive peace along with unification 
as the only criteria that determine the value of the 
meeting. However, the success of the negotiation 
process in itself should not be relegated.
It is important to acknowledge that external 
factors played a significant role in facilitating this 
summit and in driving these leaders to meet. The 
most prominent were the US’ call for additional trade 
sanctions on North Korea in 2017 (Borger, 2017; 
Harrell & Zarate, 2018; McCurry, 2018) and the pass-
ing of several new resolutions by the UN Security 
Council, which boosted sanctions in a number of 
areas including a ban on coal and iron exports and 
restrictions on oil imports (Albert, 2019).
However, this study does not focus on the inter-
nal-external dynamics that motivated the meeting. 
Instead, it seeks to challenge the interpretation that 
the Inter-Korean summit itself was an ineffectual 
“exercise in symbolism.” While steps toward peace 
and eventual unification may arguably have been 
the primary objectives of the talks, they were far 
from the only interesting dynamics at work during 
the actual summit. This study aims to present an 
alternative way of looking at the diplomatic ne-
gotiations along with their potential significance. 
Following a cross-cultural approach to the under-
standing of culture and memory, the study looks at 
the internal remembrance processes at work during 
the summit in order to investigate how memory can 
be utilised as a practice that alters relations. More 
precisely, the study investigates the use of cultural 
artefacts and different forms of “cultural memory” 
in performative acts. The essential question here is 
whether the selected mode of addressing cultural 
memories created the space for a familiar dialogue 
between the two actors.
A Cultural memory approach
In order to investigate the importance of the cultur-
al memory practices observed during the summit, it 
is necessary to outline the theoretical framework of 
this study in terms of its position within the memory 
studies field. The basis of memory studies as a field 
is the understanding of memories not as something 
fully individual, but something that is also inher-
ently cultural, social and collective in nature. This 
study draws its understanding of cultural memory 
from Astrid Erll (2008, 2009) and Ann Rigney’s 
(2005, 2009) studies on the concept. In the book A 
Companion to Cultural Memory Studies, Astrid Erll 
presented “the interplay of present and past in so-
cio-cultural contexts” (Erll, 2008, p. 2) as a simplistic 
way of defining the dynamics of cultural memory. 
Elaborating on this, Erll suggested that memory 
should be seen at two levels: cognitive and social. 
In practice, these two levels continuously interact. 
Memory neither works on a purely pre-cultural, indi-
vidual level nor on a fully collective level. Erll argues 
that we remember in socio-cultural contexts as “our 
memories are often triggered as well as shaped by 












work done by Jan and Aleida Assmann, Rigney 
(2005) lays out the developments of the memory 
studies field from Maurice Halbwachs’s original 
concept of “mémoire collective” to the current 
culture-focused version. She argues that “the term 
‘cultural memory’ highlights the extent to which 
shared memories of the past are the product of me-
diation, textualization and acts of communication” 
(Rigney, 2005, p. 14). Cultural memory is perform-
ative, and the things we remember about the past 
are products of current memory practices within 
different contexts. Cultural memory should not be 
considered something that spontaneously appears 
(Nora, 1996, p. 12). It is not something we have, but 
something we do (Olick, 2008, p. 159) and both 
what is remembered and how it is remembered are 
important for the meaning the past assumes (Erll, 
2008, p. 7). Essentially, it is the constant process 
of remediation and recontextualisation of cultural 
memory that works to renegotiate current relations 
(Erll & Rigney, 2009).
To conceptualise these memory practices, Erll 
presents the idea of different “modes of remem-
bering” the past and provides the example of how a 
war, depeding on context and group dynamics, can 
actively be remembered in numerous ways: as a 
political or historical conflict, a family tragedy or as 
trauma (2008, p. 7). Jan Assmann presents the idea 
that what we remember creates our understanding 
of selfhood (Assmann, 2008, p. 109). How and what 
we choose to remember at a given time, more or less 
consciously, can be said to guide how we act and 
how we understand our relation to others. This is also 
applicable on a national level (J. Assmann, 2008; Erll, 
2008). Assmann suggests that we create the nation-
al us and them based on our understanding of the 
past. The politics of memory is a convoluted affair 
and using a cultural memory approach enables a 
look at the dynamics between memory practices and 
negotiations of group identity within a given context.
Looking at the construction of the first 2018 
Inter-Korean Summit, this study seeks to examine 
the artefacts and selected memory practices 
utilised to open up the dialogue between the two 
political actors about the future relations of their 
states. Some critics may contradictorily argue that 
the summit evaded addressing memory altogether 
so as to avoid dealing directly with the conflictual 
memories between North and South. However, 
completely avoiding the aspect of memory in the 
context of a complex socio-political conflict is im-
possible. This study thus suggests that their select-
ed mode of addressing memory during the summit 
lay in the dynamics between “purposeful forgetting” 
and “selective remembering.” These two aspects 
are considered crucial components within the pol-
itics of memory (Mageo, 2001) and both worked to 
shape the summit. It is important to note that this 
study does not claim that a homogeneous memory 
culture exists between nor within the two Koreas. 
Rather, the study works within the understanding 
that “a number of normative and formative texts, 
places, persons, artefacts, and myths” (Assmann, 
2008, p. 108) constitute a form of “memory canon” 
which, to some extent, is familiar to both sides. 
During the summit, a number of these canonical 
elements seem to have been employed with the 
purpose of initiating a certain mode of remember-
ing Inter-Korean relations within the temporality of 
the meeting. Successful negotiation was arguably 
found through the chosen address.
The summit: Cultural memory practices
The Inter-Korean Summit on 27 April 2018 was 
held under the official slogan ‘Peace, a new start’ 
(평화, 새로운 시작) (Sohn, 2018). In creating this 
narrative, the organisers set up the framework for a 
meeting which could potentially mark the beginning 
of something new. The framework is, in itself, not 
unique from the two previous Inter-Korean summits 
as it strongly resembles the sentiment seen during 
the South Korean “Sunshine Policy” of the late-
1990s and early-2000s. The first two Inter-Korean 
summits were held in 2000 and 2007, and both 
were enabled by the Sunshine Policy which worked 







than force, and that engagement through dialogue 
and economic and cultural exchanges would bring 
about a change in the North and foster peace 
between the two Koreas” (Shin, 2018). Instead of 
paying attention to the narrative itself, it is rather 
the particular remembrance practices in use that 
are worth investigating.
In the next section of this study, five different 
parts of the summit schedule are analysed to illus-
trate different practices and negotiations. These 
five examples are far from the only ones, but they 
illustrate some of the most prominent themes. The 
primary source material used in the analysis is the 
full live stream of the summit provided by the South 
Korean broadcasting station, KBS News.
I. Panmunjom and the emotional setting during the 
border crossing
The venue of the summit was the Joint Security 
Area (JSA) between North and South Korea, which 
is often referred to as Panmunjom in popular media 
due to both its physical and symbolic proximity 
to the original “truce village” where the Armistice 
Agreement was signed (“The DMZ,” 2010). Panmun-
jom is often perceived as the embodiment of the 
division (“Venue for Koreas Summit,” 2018) and 
thus acts as a strong symbolic and visual memory 
trigger in connection to the Korean War. The prede-
termined memories and usual practices connected 
to this place mark the importance of the space 
within which the summit was carried out.
On 27 April at 09:30, Kim Jong Un came out of 
the main building on the northern side of the Military 
Demarcation Line in Panmunjom. Surrounded by 
his delegation, Kim walked up to the line where 
Moon Jae In stood waiting for him. With his hand 
stretched out, Moon greeted Kim and invited him 
to cross (“2018 Inter-Korean Summit”, 2018, 1:09). 
This moment was a clear break with usual border 
practices and the first time since the division that 
a North Korean leader was allowed to set foot on 
South Korean soil (Fifield, 2018). As something that 
can be regarded as a tone-setting gesture, Kim af-
terwards reciprocally and unscripted let Moon cross 
the border into North Korea for a brief moment. 
They were afterwards seen stepping over the line 
and returning to the southern side, holding hands 
while smiling broadly at each other. What was seen 
during this first section of the summit, was a series 
of physical acts and bodily practices to establish an 
emotionally open space. These practices created 
an image of two people from the same community 
meeting and greeting after a long time apart. While 
this could be considered a purely symbolic act, it 
created a temporary break from the memories con-
nected to the place and set the emotional tone for 
the rest of the summit. Essentially, it laid the foun-
dation upon which the following negotiations could 
take place. Furthermore, it served to signify how 
near in proximity the two sides actually are, which 
Kim also expressed during the afternoon session at 
the Peace House:
…The demarcation line wasn’t even that high to 
cross. It was crossed so easily, but it still took 11 
years for it to happen. While I was walking over 
here today, I thought to myself: why did it take 
such a long time? I had initially thought it would be 
harder to do. ([…]분계선이 사람들이 넘기 힘든 
높이도 아니고 너무 쉽게 넘어오는데 11년이 
걸렸다. 오늘 걸어오면서 보니까 왜 그 시간이 
오랬나, 오기 힘들었나 하는 생각이 들었습니
다) (2018 Inter-Korean Summit, 2018, 6:41:02)
II. Military Guard of honour as a cultural artefact 
from Joseon Dynasty
After crossing the border, the two leaders were 
escorted by a traditional guard of honour along 
the Military Demarcation Line (“2018 Inter-Korean 
Summit”, 2018, 1:12). On both sides of the leaders, 
regular palace guards were lined up, and together 
with a military marching band in front, they formed 
a rectangular shape. While this was meant to serve 
as a gesture of respect towards Kim Jong Un, it 
was also a visual representation of a traditional 












Joseon Dynasty (1392–1910) (“Our country’s guard 
of honour,” Dailian, 2012). In a sense, the guard of 
honour can be considered a purposefully selected 
relic from their past which provides Koreans with a 
visual framework that triggers memories of a Korean 
Peninsula under a united dynasty. This idea that arte-
facts can be “fished” out of the archive and brought 
into play during social interactions is something 
often discussed in relation to acts of remembering 
the past (Rigney, 2005). Rigney (2005) argues that 
“public remembrance changes in line with the shift-
ing social frameworks within which historical identity 
is conceived” (p. 23). By choosing to commemorate 
the Joseon Dynasty, a momentary shift was created 
in the current mode of remembering their common 
past. Under normal circumstances, Inter-Korean rela-
tions are dominated by memories of the Korean War; 
however, with the selected remembering inscribed 
in this performance, memories of the period before 
the division of Korea took centre stage and imple-
mented a purposeful forgetfulness of the memories 
of conflict. This kind of performance is essentially 
what anthropologist Paul Connerton refers to when 
he argues that recollected knowledge of the past 
is conveyed and sustained by bodily practices and 
ritual performances (Connerton, 1989, pp. 3–4). By 
enacting this performance, the two states renegoti-
ated the chosen mode of addressing their past and 
thereby altered their relations within the given time 
and space of the summit.
The use of Joseon Dynasty costumes and instru-
ments can also be seen as part of a recovery project, 
an attempt to resurrect a sense of “imagined com-
munity” (Anderson, 2006) between the two pres-
ent-day Koreas, based on past proximity of the two. 
Overall, the way their past is presented throughout 
the summit can be seen as a specific mode of re-
membering that foregrounds the notion of a home-
land tragically separated by a political partition, with 
the meeting attempting to regain common ground. 
This negotiation tactic aligns with the studies of cul-
tural historian John R. Gillis who highlights that “civil 
spaces” are “essential to the democratic processes 
by which individuals and groups come together to 
discuss, debate, and negotiate the past and, through 
this process, define the future” (1994, p. 20). The 
encounter during the meeting was constructed 
in a way that should create a sense of civility and 
familiarity.
III. Arirang creating a sense of unity
While the military guard of honour escorted the two 
leaders towards the Peace House, a significant an-
them was played (“2018 Inter-Korean Summit”, 2018, 
1:12). Arirang is a traditional Korean folk song dating 
back long before the division and used in both North 
and South Korea. This song has often been used in 
other contexts to bring the two sides together. During 
the opening of the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics, 
for example, Arirang functioned as a shared na-
tional anthem for the unified Korean women’s team 
(Strother, 2018). Furthermore, Arirang is inscribed 
on UNESCO’s Intangible Cultural Heritage list as 
heritage belonging to both DPRK and ROK (referred 
to as Arirang folk song and Arirang lyrical folk song) 
giving the song a symbolic status of a shared cultural 
artefact of value. Like the Joseon costumes, this 
song was a cultural artefact used to evoke a sense of 
shared community during the summit.
To underpin this, it is relevant to mention Arirang’s 
reappearance at the proceeding Inter-Korean Sum-
mit held in North Korea on 20 September 2018. In a 
broadcasted clip from this summit provided by SBS 
News, Chairman Kim, President Moon, their wives 
and the remaining delegations are seen listening to 
a performance of Arirang. Moon Jae In’s wife, Kim 
Jung Sook, and Kim Jong Un’s wife, Ri Sol Ju, were 
seen smiling and laughing familiarly at each other 
while singing along (“The sound that united,” 2018). 
This clip reaffirms the familiarity of the song and 








IV. The narrative of new beginnings at the ‘Peace 
House’
Upon arriving at the Peace House, Kim Jong Un 
wrote a message in the visitor’s book:
A new history begins now. An age of peace, at the 
starting point of history (새로운 력사는 이제부
터. 평화의 시대, 력사의 출발점에서) (“The 
sound that united,” 2018, 2:54).
Kim’s words suggest that the meeting was a venue 
for the two parties to “cut-off” history. However, the 
sequence of temporality itself cannot be abolished 
even if that is what “the starting point of history” in-
sinuates. Cultural memory will always be part of the 
negotiations. This sentiment is supported by Paul 
Connerton (1989) who states that all beginnings 
contain an element of recollection. He argues this 
is especially true when a group makes a concerted 
effort to start over since “there is a measure of 
complete arbitrariness in the very nature of any 
such attempted beginning” (Connerton, 1989, p. 6). 
Current modes of remembering the past would first 
have to be addressed and altered. The Korean War 
has primarily been remembered on both sides as a 
bitter invasion by the other. North Korea, in a post-
war perspective, has been seen to mainly blame 
what they refer to as the “U.S imperialist invaders,” 
but they also fault the South for being a “puppet 
clique” as can be seen in an official North Korean 
history source on the Korean war (“Outstanding 
leadership,” 1993).
Concurrently, there is also a continuous sense 
of betrayal to be found within various South Korean 
“media of cultural remembering” (Erll, 2009, p. 118). 
In South Korean historical texts and museums 
about the war, the notion of an unlawful and unfair 
invasion of the South by the North is still strong. This 
offence is often directly referred to as the “unjust/
illegal invasion of the South” (불법 남침). Since this 
narrative about the war still stands strong, the act 
of purposeful forgetting is a necessary part of the 
peace negotiation process. During the summit, they 
selectively illuminated memories of national trauma, 
including the tragic separation of families and the 
homeland. The shift towards focussing on familiarity 
and homeland separation was also apparent in the fi-
nal Panmunjom Declaration, where “South and North 
Korea agreed to proceed with reunion programs for 
the separated families on the occasion of the National 
Liberation Day of August 15” (Ministry of Unification, 
2018). This promise was later actualised, further 
proving the effectiveness of the given negotiation. It 
can thus be argued that their repositioning in terms 
of the past carried the dialogue.
V. Tree-planting ceremony and the rise of a small 
memorial
In the afternoon, the two leaders met for a tree-plant-
ing ceremony. This kind of ritual performance has 
often been used as a way for leaders to mark new 
beginnings or commemorate past events (Sanders, 
2018). In this study, the term “ritual” is understood 
as something performed, “an aesthetically marked 
and tightened mode of communication, framed in 
a special way and put on display for an audience” 
(Bauman, as cited in Rothenbuhler, 1998, p. 9). It can 
be seen as a rule-governed activity of symbolic value 
that draws the attention of its participants to objects 
of thought and feeling (Lukes, 1975, p. 291). During the 
tree-planting, President Moon shovelled soil from the 
North’s Baekdusan, while the soil used by Chairman 
Kim was from Hallasan on the southern side (“2018 
Inter-Korean summit,” 2018, 8:07). Likewise, water 
from Han River of the South and the Daedong River 
in the North was used to water the pine tree.
With rituals, it is essential to pay attention to the 
details that show a political attempt at inscribing 
new meaning into the venue site. For example, a pine 
tree is a traditional symbol of peace and prosper-
ity (“2018 Inter-Korean summit highlights review,” 
2018), and the particular tree used for this summit 
was purposefully chosen for its age of 65 years, the 
same number of years since Korea has been in a 
state of ceasefire after the signing of the Armistice. 
The tree hereby symbolises entering a new era of 












water of the entire Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, 
rituals function as means of transmitting cultural 
memory (Connerton, 1989, p. 52). In his study, How 
Societies Remember, Connerton (1989) argues that 
deliberate changes in cultural memory often happen 
through a form of performative practice. When 
trying to create a break and figuratively establish a 
“new beginning,” something material and physical 
is often used to stand as the embodiment of this 
change (Connerton, 1989, p. 4). The ritual performed 
during the summit was arguably meant to establish 
an embodied symbol of the beginning of a healing 
process. To commemorate this, a stone was placed 
with the words “Peace and prosperity are planted” 
(평화와 번영을 심다).
Even though peace was not obtained during 
the meeting, this stone stands as a reminder of the 
dialogue; a form of spatial memory trigger. Moreover, 
should these peace negotiations fall flat as the Inter-
Korean summits of the 2000s did, this monument 
will stand as a message. It will act as a reminder of 
the specific approach under which dialogue was 
made possible.
Concluding thoughts
This study set out to demonstrate the significance 
and complexity of the memory negotiations that 
took place during the summit and, thereby, oppose 
the interpretation of the summit as mere ineffectual 
symbolism. When working with the concept of cul-
tural memory as an analytical tool, it is important 
to remember that it is essentially an operative 
metaphor (Erll, 2008, p. 4). In other words, there 
will always be a personal aspect to the intake of 
the cultural memories mediated. A critique of this 
approach could, therefore, be that with the primary 
material used in this study, one cannot know how 
individual actors received the given memory prac-
tices and perceived the overall peace negotiations.
Nonetheless, cultural memory as an analytical 
frame work provided the opportunity to look at the 
way the Inter-Korean summit successfully evaded 
activating contesting memories during the peace 
negotiations through purposeful utilisation of cul-
tural artefacts and performative memory practices. 
The analysis illustrated how “purposeful forgetting” 
and “selective remembering” were used politically to 
create a temporary shared frame of reference that 
enabled diplomatic talks between these two actors. 
While this process of recontextualising cultural mem-
ory, in actuality, did not change the current status of 
North and South Korea, it was an attempt to renego-
tiate their future diplomatic relations by altering their 
specific mode of remembering the past.
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